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ABSTRACT
This paper follows European countries as they struggled through the first wave
of the Sars-CoV-2 pandemic. We analyze when countries were confronted with
the virus, how long it took until the number of new infections peaked and at
what level of infections that peak was achieved via social distancing and
lockdown policies. Most European countries were able to successfully end
the first wave of the pandemic – defined as a two-week incidence rate
smaller than 10 cases per 100,000 people. We find that countries in which
the virus made significant landfall later in time enjoyed a latecomer
advantage that some of these countries squandered, however, by not
responding quickly enough and that an early lockdown was more effective
than a hard lockdown.
KEYWORDS Covid-19; first wave; lockdown; pandemic; Sars-CoV-2
Introduction
Pandemics often come in waves. This is so for two main reasons: firstly, social
distancing measures and lockdowns can powerfully reduce infection rates.
They are, however, costly and tiring, and therefore, typically cannot be sus-
tained over a sufficiently long period. If fewer and fewer people follow
social distancing norms, the virus comes back. Or, secondly, the virus
mutates and, as with the Spanish flu in its second wave (Kobasa et al.,
2004; Paulo et al., 2010), returns and predominantly affects a different
group of people. With the end of the holiday season in Europe (Plümper &
Neumayer, 2020a), infection rates were rising in most European countries
and the pandemic was back in full force. Still, this article focuses on and
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aims at developing a systematic descriptive analysis of the first wave of the
Sars-CoV-2 pandemic in Europe.1
We aim to understand whether and to what extent policy responses have
shaped the curvature of the first wave. We are particularly interested in three
aspects of the first wave, namely, the time it took from a few cases to 1000
cumulative cases, the size of the peak infection rate (the height of the
wave), and the time it took from the peak to a low two-week incidence
rate of below 10 new infections per 100,000 people. In all three dimensions,
the observable variation across countries is astonishingly large. It took Italy 8
but Bulgaria 48 days from 10 known cases to 1000 known cases. Greece
peaked at 10.66 infections per 100,000 people, whilst Iceland’s peak was
more than 20 times more severe at 277.04 infections and Luxembourg
peaked at 348.92 infections per 100,000 people. Likewise, Austria and
Iceland took 30 days from their peaks to containing the infection, defined
as a two-week incidence rate smaller than 10 per 100,000 people, while it
took Italy and the Netherlands more than twice as long for the same improve-
ment. These are staggering differences – differences which are neither satis-
factorily explained by epidemiological models nor by lockdown policies alike.
The data we employ, taken from the ECDC, the European Center of Disease
Prevention and Control (www.ecdc.europa.eu), necessarily contain substan-
tial measurement error. For example, true infection rates remain unknown,
the ECDC merely reports data based on the number of positive tests per
day, which are to some extent be influenced by a country’s willingness and
ability to undertake testing. As another example, whilst we employ the
widely used Oxford University’s Covid-19 government response tracker
(Hale et al. 2020) for coding our main policy response, namely a recommen-
dation or, depending on the country, mandate for citizens to stay-at-home,
aka lockdown, one can look at different responses or code such responses
differently and thereby perhaps come to somewhat different conclusions.
With these caveats in mind, we nevertheless will draw some descriptive
inferences that we believe will prove to be robust to the apparent endogene-
ity problems and measurement errors. To start with, we observe on average a
clear disadvantage of countries that were affected first and before others in
Europe. The later in calendar time the virus made significant landfall in a
country, the longer it took from 10 to 1000 cases and the lower were peak
infection rates on average across countries. Countries in which the virus
entered later, which Medeiros et al. (2020) term latecomers, could learn
from other European countries where the virus had made landfall earlier.
This implies indirectly that observing the Chinese experience, which
perhaps should have been sufficient, was in fact rather irrelevant to European
policy-makers. The most drastic lockdown of any population in modern
history, as happened in the Chinese city of Wuhan, somehow did not
suffice as a wake-up call.
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The first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic demonstrated in many respects
that European countries were not well prepared for dealing and coping with
the emergent risks of a pandemic (Bouckaert et al., 2020): some countries did
not have enough intensive care units, ventilators were scarce and virtually no
country had sufficient protective gear for medical staff and masks for the
broad public. Given the nature of the pandemic, it also would have been a
good idea to command over a relatively large number of mobile ICUs as
the virus shows large regional variation.2
We show that lockdown policies can usefully be broken down into two
dimensions. In a first dimension, governments can choose between an
early, a medium late and a late response or choose not to employ a lockdown
at all. By early, medium late and late we do not mean actual time but epide-
miological time, so to speak, namely at what stage of the pandemic’s spread
in the country the policy measure was chosen. In the second dimension they
can choose the level of stringency of the lockdown policy, from a soft rec-
ommendation to stay at home, to a moderate stay at home directive or a
much harder order not to leave home with few clearly specified exceptions.
Our descriptive analysis suggests that speed trumps harshness. Many though
not all countries that locked down early generally had lower peak infection
levels and managed to come down from the peak of the wave to very low
levels of new infections faster than late adopters, whereas there is enormous
variation in success by degree of harshness of the lockdown. This suggests
that governments have a choice between an early and moderate policy
response or a late and hard policy response – a dilemma that now forcefully
returns during the second wave.
Pandemic dynamics: a simple classification
In stylized fashion, the first wave of the Sars-CoV-2 pandemic can be divided
into three phases: In the first phase, governments and populations are naïve
and essentially ignore the risks associated with the virus. During this period,
politicians, if aware of the existence of the virus in other countries, often claim
that it is unlikely that the virus reaches their country and if that were to
happen the country would be ‘well prepared’. Likewise, the population is
not yet alarmed at this initial stage and have not yet adjusted their social
behaviour to the risks of becoming infected. In fact, neither members of
the public nor the government do anything significant to prevent infections.
In this phase, Sars-CoV-2 spreads at an exponential rate.
The first phase ends and the second one begins when the risks associated
with the virus become all too clear and both governments and individuals
start taking preventive measures (Plümper & Neumayer, 2020b). In this
second phase, some individuals begin to behave differently, norms of
social distancing emerge and governments start prohibiting certain forms
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of social interaction. Large events are banned, schools and universities are
closed, shops are shut, a stay-home policy is recommended or mandated.
Eventually, travel restrictions are implemented. If behavioural and social dis-
tancing measures are effective, the spread of the virus slows down (Maier &
Brockmann, 2020; Schmitt, 2020). Tomas Pueyo (2020) has coined the term
‘the hammer’ for this second phase of a pandemic. The ‘hammer’ signifies
that the measures taken to reduce the number of new infections are blunt
and hard hitting with governments seeing no other option in their aim to
prevent the health system from collapsing as more and more patients
suffering from Covid-19 are sent to hospitals and intensive-care units.
The third phase is reached if (and only if) the hammer was successful.
When the virus seems almost defeated, governments start to lift restrictive
measures, allow a resurrection of social life and the ‘dance’, Pueyo’s (2020)
term for the period after the ‘hammer’, begins. Governments replace the
strategy of national lockdown with a local strategy in which newly emerging
cases are being traced and isolated in order to suppress contact between
infected and uninfected people. The third phase works best when all new
infections are identified and isolated. Hence, the number of tests remains
high. The term ‘dance’ describes that the policies in the third phase are not
static, because the epidemiological situation reached by the ‘hammer’ is
not stable. During the third phase, governments occasionally have to re-
implement partial lockdown measures wherever a local hotspot emerges
and threaten to get out of control.
The next three sections descriptively analyze each of these phases in more
detail.3 As we now observe, the ‘dance’ is also not necessarily stable. During
the autumn of 2020, governments in Europe brought the hammer back and
applied a more moderate version of the lockdown to fight the second wave.
From naivety to a first line of response: the early days of the
pandemic in Europe
Before the risks associated with Covid-19 became obvious in late February,
many politicians doubted that the virus would spread to Europe at all.
Despite the drastic pictures from Wuhan in China, the pandemic-in-the-
making was only taken seriously once infection numbers in Italy and Spain
rose exponentially and pictures of the brutal reality in Northern Italian hospi-
tals showed the stark possibility of a collapsing health system at home. Italy
was the first European country in which the virus spiraled out of control (Ghi-
slandi et al., 2020), but in pandemic terms the Italian infection curve was only
roughly one or two weeks ahead of the developments in Austria, Spain, Swit-
zerland, France, Germany and the UK. The ski holiday season in the Alps
(Plümper and Neumayer 2020b), business and other tourism travel across
the continent and some events such as international football matches
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(Hunter, 2020; Parnell et al., 2020) and the carnival (Laliotis & Minos, 2020)
helped the virus to reach even remote locations. The policy of tracing
single infections and isolating individual spreaders had failed before it
really begun.
Figure 1 displays the arrival of the Sars-Cov-2 in European countries. The
bars begin when a country reached 10 cumulative infections and it ends
when the country reached 1000 cumulative infections, with the line within
the bar marking the day on which a country had reached 100 known infec-
tions. Early countries reached 10 known cases in February, late countries
around mid-March. Any interpretation of Figure 1 should take into consider-
ation that the uncertainty of the data is relatively large and particularly so in
the first phase of the pandemic. Known infection rates are clearly not precise
measures, especially not in the early days before mass testing became poss-
ible. In most countries testing capacities were still relatively low and people
were only tested if they had symptoms and had travelled to countries which
were perceived as infection hotspots or if they had interacted with travellers
from these countries.
With these cautionary remarks in mind, the data in Figure 1 show that (a)
the virus did not reach all European nations at approximately the same time
and that (b) the later a country reached 10 known infections, the longer on
Figure 1. Timeline of 10, 100, 1000 known infections.
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average it took a country to reach 1000 known infections. The first European
country to reach 1000 known cases was Italy on day 60 (February 29), the last
one was Bulgaria on day 113 (April 24). Italy went from 10 to 1000 known
infections in only 8 days, Bulgaria in 41 days. On average, for each day a
country took longer to reach 10 infections, the number of days it took the
country to get from 10 to 1000 infections increased by 1.44 days. On
average, therefore, the initial part of the exponential curve of the first wave
was flatter in countries that were affected later.
The latecomer advantage cannot be attributed to a single factor. Instead,
we suspect the following factors played a role: First, the pandemic could
initially evolve completely undetected in the countries the virus reached
first. Italy provides the best example for a country that was hit hard and
largely by surprise. By contrast, latecomers were not taken by surprise.
When the pandemic reached Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands and Austria
the virus was already expected. In fact, as we will show in the next section,
in some but not all countries the TV pictures from Italy had triggered political
decisions when known infection numbers were still very low.
Second, the later in time countries started to experience an exponential
increase of infection numbers, the more people had already started to
change their behaviour and voluntarily implemented some social distancing
measures. In some countries, social distancing begun not because the gov-
ernment implemented measures but because more and more people had
seen footage of the meltdown of the Italian health system, became scared
and changed their behaviour (Andersen, 2020; Chudik et al., 2020). Third,
during the early stage of the pandemic the number of undetected infections
was large and the virus could spread rapidly. When the virus reached lateco-
mer countries up to three weeks later than those affected early on, often
testing capacity had improved.4
Between a hammer and a hard place: covid-19
politics in Europe
Many countries, at least in theory, had plans in the drawer for a global pan-
demic. During January and February, however, the evidence of a serious pan-
demic mounted, but governments did little to gear up for the storm to come
in March and April. Some countries gave away protective equipment to
others without aggressively replenishing their own stocks – a sign of both
admirable willingness to help others but also of wishful thinking that the
same fate would escape them. Looking back, Germany may have been
better prepared than many other European countries. However, the govern-
ment apparently expected that it would be possible to quickly isolate the
infected and prevent the uncontrolled spread of the virus. On February 18,
when the virus had definitely reached Europe, Germany sent 8.4 tons of
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protective medical gear to China – gear that hospitals and medical personnel
sorely missed later on.5 On March 2, the German government sent protective
medical clothing to Iran. The same day the Robert-Koch-Institute raised the
threat level for Germany from low to moderate. At this stage, super-spreader
events in Ischgl and elsewhere had already propelled the virus to virtually
most or perhaps even all European countries.
In the meantime, Italy had lost control over the pandemic situation. As a
consequence, the government reached for the hammer and Italy became
the first European country to impose restrictive anti-coronavirus measures.
Facing an exponential growth of SARS-CoV-2 cases, albeit from the still low
level of 79 known cases, and the first two deaths, Italy’s government pulled
the trigger on February 23 and closed schools and non-essential workplaces,
prohibited events and public gatherings in affected places. When Italy
imposed a lockdown on March 8 on the region of Lombardy and selected dis-
tricts in Veneto, Emilia-Romagna, Piedmont and Marche, more than 6000
known infection cases had already been identified by its health authorities.
The lockdown was harsh and precluded the free movement of people in
and out of the affected regions. One week later, the Italian government
expanded the lockdown to the entire country. At this point, the number of
known infections had risen to 12,000 people.
Many observers today believe that Italy responded too late and the
attempt to contain the virus in the initially affected region failed.6
However, if we measure the response timeliness by the number of known
infections on the day a partial or nation-wide lockdown was implemented,
Italy was in fact fairly early by comparison to many of its European peers.
On March 8, the day the Italian government imposed a quarantine in
affected regions, Italy had roughly 12 known cumulative infections per
100,000 people. Italy may have responded late, but by this standard, other
European governments including Belgium (26 cumulative infections per
100,000 people), Estonia (38), Ireland (47), Luxemburg (23), and Spain (21)
responded even later though their governments had or at least could have
had better information.
Perhaps surprisingly, the calendar date of the lockdown and the popu-
lation-standardized number of known infections are positively correlated.
On the one hand, this seems obvious: the later a government imposes anti-
coronavirus measures, the higher the number of known infections on that
day, everything else being equal. Upon closer inspection, however, the
logic appears less compelling: Italy’s experience from late February and
early March should have sent strong signals to countries that were behind
on the upward curve of the pandemic. In fact, policy-makers could have
learned that they need to respond at a lower number of population-standar-
dized infections since they were clearly in a position to extrapolate what will
happen if they did not do so. Yet, many governments waited for the virus to
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become a major problem in their own country before they were willing or
able to take unpopular measures (Hunter, 2020). The Republic of Ireland
serves as a good example: the government waited until March 27 to issue
a stay-at-home order. On this day the country experienced an escalating
death toll and the cumulative number of confirmed cases had risen to
2121. Simulations suggest that if the government had responded one week
earlier, the peak number of known infections would have been approximately
75 per cent lower. The UK provides another example. The Johnson govern-
ment pondered with the idea of implementing what has since become
known as the Swedish strategy, which avoids a lockdown and allows a rela-
tively high number of infections, possibly to reach the unstated goal of
herd immunity.7
When push came to shove, governments only had a choice between three
main strategies for dealing with the rising tide: do nothing; test, trace and
quarantine; and the imposition of social distancing measures typically culmi-
nating in a lockdown. The first strategy is not viable with the virus threatening
to overwhelm the health care system and kill a very large number of people.
All other things equal, governments prefer the second strategy to the third
strategy. When governments, which initially had underestimated the pan-
demic, became aware of the sheer scale of the wave of infections and their
rapid growth, the tracing option quickly became impossible to pursue, not
least because tests were not available in sufficient numbers in the beginning
for the strategy to work despite efforts to ramp up testing capacity. In other
words, the second option was not really viable either. The vast majority of
governments, therefore, sooner or later opted for the third strategy, which
combines various social distancing measures and typically culminates in a
lockdown that can be imposed regionally (as in Russia) or nationally and
that can vary drastically in its stringency (see Table 1).
Table 1 analyzes a country’s stay-at-home (lockdown) policies, with data
taken from Hale et al. (2020) of Oxford University. Of all the policies coded
by Hale et al. (2020), we choose the stay-at-home policy as the policy that
is most clearly and directly linked to the notion of a lockdown. Also, many
of other policies become almost necessary by a stay-at-home policy. For
example, it makes little sense to keep restaurants and bars open if people
are under order to stay home. We analyze lockdown policies in two dimen-
sions. One dimension codes their stringency, along 4 categories, from 0 –
No measures, 1 – recommend not leaving house (soft lockdown), 2 –
require not leaving house with exceptions for daily exercise, grocery shop-
ping, and ‘essential’ trips (moderate lockdown), to 3 – require not leaving
house with minimal exceptions (e.g., allowed to leave only once a week, or
only one person can leave at a time, etc.), which represents a hard lockdown.
The second dimension differentiates countries according to the population-
standardized number of known cumulative infections on the day of the
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lockdown. Note that, this measures the timeliness of lockdown measures in
epidemiological terms rather than calendar days though in Table 1 we also
state the calendar day of the year 2020 whenmeasures were taken. Early lock-
down covers countries that went into lockdown with fewer than 5 known
cumulative infections per 100,000 people, medium late lockdown captures
countries that went into lockdown with between 5 and 10 known cumulative
cases per 100,000 people, and late lockdown consists of countries that went
into lockdown after 10 known cumulative cases per 100,000 people. Admit-
tedly, there exists some uncertainty about these categories since we
cannot assume that the number of unrecorded (unknown) cases was
roughly similar in all countries because the ability and willingness of countries
to test differs. Note that some countries appear twice as they impose a harder
lockdown after a softer start, with their country names shown in italics at the
point of softer initial start.
Table 1 suggests that, with the exception of Ireland,8 a soft lockdown
was only an option ever chosen by countries that responded early in
Table 1. Lockdowns in European countries by epidemiological timeliness and
stringency.
No
lockdown
Late lockdown (>10
cum. infections per
100 k)
Medium late lockdown
(>5 and <10 cum.
infections per 100 k)
Early lockdown (<5
cum. infections per
100 k)
Belarus
Iceland
Norway
Sweden
Soft lockdown Ireland 87 Denmark 64
Netherlands 67
Germany 70
Hungary 73
Latvia
Romania 73
Slovenia 76
Finland 77
Lithuania 77
Ukraine 77
Moderate
lockdown
Italy 69
Spain 75
Switzerland 78
Luxemburg 78
Belgium 79
Germany 82
Netherlands 83
United Kingdom 83
Cyprus 87
Ireland 89
Estonia 90
Austria 77
France 78
Portugal 80
Greece 84
Moldova 85
Poland 92
Russia 66
Albania 72
Kosovo 73
Bulgaria 74
Czechia 76
Serbia 76
Croatia 84
Romania 86
Hungary 88
Ukraine 95
Hard lockdown Italy 81
Russia 91
Serbia 79
Bosnia-Herzegovina
81
Note: Numbers indicate the day of the year 2020 the measure was implemented, cases in italic have
adjusted their lockdown strategy.
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epidemiological terms, i.e., where the number of infections per 100,000
people was below 5. We see two non-mutually exclusive reasons for this
finding: one explanation suggests that a soft response does not always
allow countries to stop the exponential growth that the pandemic had
in phase 1. Countries that lockdown late, therefore, did not waste time
with a strategy that may not always work well. We thus find that countries
that employed more stringent lockdowns tended to lockdown later in
calendar time and as time proceeded through March and April the
public’s acceptance of harsher measures had increased as it became
increasingly visible that more and more countries ran into capacity limits
in their health system. Further research needs to analyze why the ‘early
and soft’ strategy was stable in Denmark, Finland, Slovenia, and Lithuania
while other countries, including the Netherlands, Germany, and Hungary
sharpened the lockdown rules between one and two weeks after soft
rules were implemented. We suspect that the population in countries in
which soft lockdowns worked pursued greater discipline in social distan-
cing. Since the population’s discipline was often lower in the autumn
when the second wave begun to roll over Europe, the second wave
allows social scientists to explore in greater depths the ‘soft behavioural
factors’ influencing a national response to the pandemic. At the other
extreme, only 4 countries imposed a hard lockdown during the first
wave, namely Italy, Serbia, Bosnia–Herzegovina and Russia though this
only refers to the capital Moscow rather than the whole country. Italy
was taken largely by surprise and saw no alternative to a hard lockdown.
The other three countries lack proper democratic checks and balances
which might render it easier to impose a hard lockdown. There is,
however, no deterministic relationship with regime type, not even in
Europe, as the example of Belarus, one of Europe’s last true autocracy,
demonstrates with no lockdown imposed as Alexander Lukashenko dis-
misses Covid-19 as a sign of personal weakness.9 Russia’s capital city of
Moscow appears to have been forced into a hard and late lockdown
when the early moderate lockdown adopted on calendar day 66 did not
suffice to win control over the virus’s spread. Both Serbia and Bosnia–Her-
zegovina tried an ‘early and hard’ strategy successfully during the first
wave. Both countries now seem to go through a relatively strong second
wave, however.10
An intermediate strategy of moderate lockdown was the choice of most
countries. This is perhaps not surprising since soft lockdowns risk being
ineffectual whilst hard lockdowns are very unpopular amongst the populace.
Amongst this group of countries are some that tried a soft and early lock-
down first, like Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Romania and Ukraine
but then moved to a still early moderate lockdown (in the case of Hungary
and Ukraine) but otherwise late moderate lockdown, probably because
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policy-makers thought that the soft lockdown would prove insufficient.
Amongst the late adopters of moderate lockdowns are typically governments
that reluctantly implemented anti-coronavirus measures and tried to avoid a
lockdown as long as possible. These governments acted late, and often unwil-
lingly, sometimes pressured by the media or by epidemiologists in the face of
rapidly rising infection rates. These countries did very little first, and then
went into a late lockdown. The UK, Ireland, Estonia and, if we look beyond
Europe, the USA provide examples for this policy choice.
Table 1 shows a moderate negative correlation between the timing and
the stringency of the policy response in terms of epidemiological time.
Leaving aside the countries that did not go into lockdown, we see a weak
pattern with Serbia and Bosnia–Herzegovina as outliers.
It was, however, also possible to avoid a lockdown. The role-model for this
strategy has been Sweden, but Iceland and Norway also never implemented a
formal stay-at-home policy. Iceland benefits from its relative remoteness, low
population density outside the capital city and its island status. It also closed
down schools, cancelled public events and restricted public transport. Norway
went even further and on March 12 implemented and enforced a number of
strict measures: educational institutions, bars, pubs and clubs were closed, cul-
tural and sports events cancelled, travellers returning from trips abroad had to
quarantine, and, from March 16 on, foreigners were no longer allowed to
enter the country. In other words, both Iceland and, particularly, Norway
implemented a relatively strict anti-coronavirus regime, but avoided a formal
lockdown. If ‘success’ means the combination of low infection and mortality
figures achieved by the softest possible policy response, Norway has arguably
been the most successful European country during the first wave.
Unless accompanied by other strict anti-coronavirus policies, the ‘no lock-
down’ strategy is difficult to maintain when infection rates keep rising though
a large part of the Swedish population seems to tolerate a mortality rate well
above its Scandinavian peers. In other countries, a similar strategy did not last
long. In the very beginning, the UK followed a strategy not dissimilar to
Sweden but was forced to implement a late moderate lockdown when the
number of active infections threatened the stability of the National Health
System (NHS). With the lockdown imposed, the NHS did not collapse, new
infections peaked at 110 cases per 100,000 people over a period of two
weeks on day 113 (April 22), roughly two weeks after comparable European
countries reached their peak. However, many blame the lateness of the lock-
down for the country’s exceptionally high mortality – both in absolute and in
per capita terms (Hunter, 2020).
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Let the dances begin: the management of local hotspots in a
low-level pandemic
The political measures implemented in phase 2 aimed at gaining control of
the spread of the virus and preventing a collapse of the health system. This
aim is reached when the effective reproduction rate of the virus falls below
1 on a sustained basis, which indicates that every infected person causes
fewer than one new infection, and the number of both new infections and
active cases, therefore, declines.
Figure 2 displays the association between peak infection rates and the
decline in infections. The x-axis is a timeline, ranging from calendar day 50
to day 300. Each bar indicates the period between the day the population-
standardized peak infection rate was reached and the day the two-
week incidence rate fell below 10 per 100,000 people. Lines within each
bar indicate the day countries reached an incidence rate of 50 and 25,
respectively. Countries that do not have lines within a bar peaked below
these thresholds. For example, Croatia peaked at 23.38 cases per 100,000
people, and therefore, has no bars within its column indicating 50 and 25
new infections.
The country that peaked first, Italy, reached the peak on day 93, April 2. It
took Italy another 64 days until June 5 to push the two-week incidence rate
Figure 2. From Peak Level to 10 Infections per 100,000 People.
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below 10. The country that managed to reach this success first was Greece,
but that was mainly due to the fact that Greece’s infection numbers during
the first wave peaked at 10.66 infections per 100,000 people. Figure 2
reveals that, by and large, countries which peaked early in calendar time
also managed to reduce the two-week incidence rate of 10 new infections
per 100,000 people threshold earlier and faster. Yet, there are exceptions.
Some countries, including the UK, Belgium, and Sweden did not reduce
their two-week incidence rates to very low levels before the second wave
begun to slowly evolve. In fact, 11 countries, including these three countries,
never managed to reduce the 2-week incidence rate to below 10 cases per
100,000 people.
We have already alluded to the fact that when it comes to pandemics there
are two distinct conceptions of time. One is the traditional one of calendar
time, the other one of epidemiological time, so to speak, measuring the
stage of the pandemic reached. Figure 2 revealed that with some exceptions
countries that peaked earlier in calendar time, managed to reach a two-week
incidence rate of below 10 cases per 100,000 people earlier. Is the same true
for countries that peaked earlier in epidemiological terms? One would expect
that the lower the peak level was, the easier it should be for countries to bring
new infections down to 10 per 100,000 people since the lower the peak the
relatively less out-of-control the pandemic has been. The perhaps most
Figure 3. Peak Infection Rate and the Time from Peak to Below 10 Cases per 100,000
People.
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surprising of our reported stylized facts is that there is no such systematic
structure discernible beyond countries that peaked at very low levels. This
is shown in Figure 3, which plots the number of days countries took from
peak to a two-week incidence rate smaller than 10 cases per 100,000
people against the peak infection rate at which these countries managed
the turnaround. Countries labelled in blue (all countries in the upper
part of the figure) have never reached a two-week incidence rate below
10 cases per 100,000 people. For these countries the y-axis measures the
difference in days between their peak and day 300.
Countries that had a very low peak infection rate usually had little
difficulty in reducing new infections to below 10 cases per 100,000
people over 2 weeks. Yet, once we focus only on countries that peaked
above 30 cases per 100,000 people the positive correlation between the
size of the peak and the time to below 10 cases per 100,000 people essen-
tially disappears. Romania, Portugal, the UK and Belgium, to name four
countries, had a relatively low peak, but none of these countries did not
manage to bring new infections below 10 per 100,000 people before the
second wave begun. Iceland, Ireland, and Luxembourg, on the other
hand, peaked at very high levels but managed to reduce infection levels
relatively quickly. We stress that this relates to getting a grip on the first
wave only.
Of the comparably slow countries to get the first wave under control, the
UK and Belgium went late into a moderate lockdown, but so did Ireland and
Luxembourg. This leads to the perhaps most important question: Does the
success in reducing infection levels, as measured by the days between
peak and 10 new infections per 100,000 people, depend on the chosen lock-
down strategy? Table 2 provides a fuller picture of the evolution of the pan-
demic than Figure 3 combined with information on the stringency and
epidemiological timing of lockdown imposed.
Table 2 allows us to suggest a number of stylized facts: First, the data
suggests that an early lockdown reduced the peak number of population-
standardized infections. Reacting early in epidemiological terms means that
the pandemic has not yet gone too much out of control which means that
it is easier to reach a lower peak level than if the pandemic is already on a
rampage. For example, neighbouring Austria and Czech Republic both
adopted a moderate lockdown but the latter does so early whilst the
former does so medium late. Austria peaks at a level that is three times
higher than the Czech Republic’s. This may partly be explained by different
testing activities. However, Austria reported only 50 per cent more tests
per capita than Czechia. It is, therefore, unlikely that testing alone accounts
for the differences in the infection dynamics.
Second, the variation in population-standardized peak infections is aston-
ishingly large even among countries that reacted at approximately the same
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epidemiological stage, particularly when they did not react early. Among the
countries adopting a moderate lockdown at a medium late stage, peak levels
vary from 16.61 (Poland) to 117.65 (Moldova). Adopting a similarly moderate
lockdown but at a late stage, peak levels vary from 49.89 in Cyprus to 348.92
in Luxembourg.
Table 2. Response stringency, timing and stabilization during the first wave.
Peak infections
per 100 k
Day
peak
Day 50 infections
per 100 k
Day 25 infections
per 100 k
Day 10 infections
per 100 k
No lockdown
Belarus 140.05 147 190 204 Truncated
Iceland 277.04 94 114 119 125
Norway 67.26 97 102 113 134
Sweden 150.30 187 203 Truncated Truncated
Early soft lockdown
Denmark 65.36 103 112 138 161
Slovenia 28.55 96 n.a. 103 117
Lithuania 25.12 95 n.a. 96 120
Finland 33.96 109 n.a. 130 151
Early moderate lockdown
Bulgaria 10.77 128 n.a. n.a. 131
Kosovo 25.19 116 n.a. 117 131
Croatia 23.38 95 n.a. n.a. 119
Czechia 34.35 100 n.a. 108 125
Serbia 63.87 114 124 135 156
Romania 25.59 108 n.a. 117 Truncated
Hungary 13.34 114 n.a. n.a. 126
Ukraine 28.85 186 n.a. 193 Truncated
Medium late moderate lockdown
Austria 102.33 93 105 113 123
France 86.12 102 116 127 142
Portugal 109.02 102 126 Truncated Truncated
Greece 10.66 96 n.a. n.a. 97
Moldova 117.65 177 Truncated Truncated Truncated
Poland 16.61 170 n.a. n.a. Truncated
Late moderate lockdown
Spain 217.56 96 126 141 164
Switzerland 168.38 95 117 125 137
Luxemburg 348.92 94 124 134 156
Belgium 181.19 103 134 151 Truncated
Germany 86.36 100 114 126 148
Netherlands 86.57 110 125 136 178
UK 110.74 113 152 178 Truncated
Cyprus 49.89 103 n.a. 116 130
Ireland 213.02 114 141 150 162
Estonia 58.95 100 104 117 129
Early hard lockdown
Serbia 63.87 114 124 135 156
Bosnia-H. 20.93 103 n.a. n.a. 143
Late hard lockdown
Italy 124.03 93 127 139 157
Russia 101.74 137 Truncated Truncated Truncated
n.a. = not applicable (because the peak level was smaller than the threshold); Truncated = the country
did not reach the incidence rate before the beginning of the 2nd wave.
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Third, there are interesting differences in the infection dynamics in the ‘no
lockdown group’. To start with, there is similarly large variation in peak
infection rates as observed for other groups, ranging from the 67.26 per
100,000 people in Norway to the 277.04 in Iceland though it should be
noted that the reported infections in Belarus appear to be unreliable and
could thus well be higher than Norway’s.
Fourth and perhaps most relevant, the peak incidence rate only had a
weak influence on the time from peak to containment. Indirectly, the lack
of a stronger systematic relation suggests that anti-coronavirus policies and
social distancing measures had a strong influence on the course of the first
wave in European countries. To give one example: Iceland had a significantly
higher peak incidence rate than Sweden, yet the country managed to reduce
infection rates much faster than Sweden. Given both countries shunned a
stay-at-home order, other preventive measures have to account for the sig-
nificant difference in dynamics though Iceland’s remoteness may have
helped. Still, Sweden is an outlier at least among Northern and Western Euro-
pean countries in more than one respect (Conyon et al., 2020; Helsingen et al.,
2020; Yan et al., 2020) and its government did not try hard to reduce the inci-
dence rate during the first wave.
Fifth and perhaps most puzzlingly, Figure 3 and Table 2 show remarkably
little systematic pattern in respect to whether countries push new infections
to below 25 cases per 100,000 people over a two-week period, let alone to
below 10 cases per 100,000 people. There are only two strategies in which
no country has failed to push infections to below the threshold of 10 new
infections per 100,000 people: early soft and early hard lockdowns.
Conclusion
With the first wave over, many European governments lifted anti-coronavirus
measures and people became more careless. And thus the pandemic
returned and the so-called second wave has begun. In virtually all European
countries, including those that managed the first wave well and had brought
new infections down to low levels, infection rates have risen in September
and October, in some countries rapidly and even exponentially. Increasingly,
countries lose the ability to identify and isolate infected individuals and to
trace and quarantine many of the individuals with which they had close
contact. Governments are again closing borders and implementing a stricter
testing and quarantine regime for homecoming tourists. Even lockdowns are
becoming en vogue again.
In this article, we have described the comparative dynamics of the first
wave. Some patterns have emerged, while other expected associations
appear to be surprisingly weak or non-existent. The first clear pattern that
we have identified is the existence of an advantage of countries in which
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the virus arrived later. The latecomer advantage manifests itself in a slower
exponential function of cumulative infections at the very start of the first
wave mainly because people already start to self-implement social distancing
norms before the government does and because some governments react
prudently having seen the situation unfold in countries where the virus
makes earlier landfall. The most striking, albeit weak association is that
between a low peak rate of infection and the time it takes to reach 10 new
infections per 100,000 people over a two-week period, which appears to
exist only for those with a very low peak rate of below 30 per 100,000
people. We have also provided some tentative evidence that an early political
response has major advantages over a stringent political response. At least to
some extent, governments have a choice between early and soft to moderate
measures or late and moderate to hard lockdown measures if they want to
bring down the infection rate quickly. However, not all governments want
to reduce infections quickly. Sweden provides the best-known example for
a country that did not go into lockdown and maintained a rather liberal atti-
tude to social life. Yet, not Sweden but Norway would be the best example for
a country that avoided a lockdown and kept, in contrast to Sweden, infections
and incidence rates low by implementing restrictive social distancing rules.
The difference between Sweden and Norway is not the absence of a lock-
down but the discipline of social distancing measures and the number of
tests. The Swedish policies came at the price of higher cumulative infection
numbers, probably avoidable excess mortality, a high mortality rate among
those older than 60 (Modig & Ebeling, 2020) and a slower decline in the inci-
dence rate. Macroeconomic data demonstrates that the economic advan-
tages of this strategy are small, and perhaps even non-existent (Eurostat,
2020). In contrast, countries that responded earlier often had a shorter lock-
down and fewer adverse economic consequences.
Still, we do not find that the combination of an early and hard lockdown
has major advantages over a similarly early but milder lockdowns. At the
same time, stricter measures come at a larger social and psychological
costs. Even from this perspective, an early implementation of measures
tends to be preferable to a later implementation, as later measures often
have to be stricter than earlier measures and have to be implemented for a
longer period to get to the same low level of new infections. The dance,
the implementation of repeated moderate anti-coronavirus measures
appears to be a promising strategy. Unfortunately, the second wave demon-
strates that European governments have not yet learned to keep infection
numbers sufficiently low through repeated early and moderate measures. It
is important to act early and stay ahead of the game. During the first wave,
the few countries that have chosen an early and moderate response strategy
kept incidence rates low.
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The perhaps most puzzling finding for political scientists is the absence of
a systematic relationship between factors that political scientists usually
deem policy-relevant and the policy choices of governments during the
first wave of the pandemic. Different types of countries did not generally
respond systematically differently and when countries responded differently,
the emerging pattern does not fit well standard public policy theories
(Béland, 2009; Kamkhaji & Radaelli, 2017). For example, ‘families of nations’
theories (Obinger & Wagschal, 2001) would hardly have predicted that Scan-
dinavian governments implemented very different policies to an identical
threat, that the response of centralized countries such as France does not
differ much from that of federal states such as Germany, that the different
role courts play in the public policy in different countries exerts only a very
minor effect at best in the first wave of the pandemic. Partisan preferences
also had a minor influence on the political response, with no clear differences
between more right-leaning and more left-leaning governments. Even the
influence of ‘populist parties’ in government was not homogeneous, with
some populist regimes downplaying the threat but Hungary, on the other
hand, being amongst those countries that adopted a medium lockdown
early on. There also seems to be no evidence that during the first wave
more decentralized, federal countries chose a nuanced regional response.
Puzzling as this may seem, as we have explained above, the lack of mass
testing capacity coupled with the sheer and largely unexpected, or at least
under-estimated, scale of infections left the vast majority of governments
with little choice than to adopt social distancing measures and to impose,
sooner or later, a lockdown of softer or harder stringency. Test, trace and
isolate was dead in the water as a strategy given the sheer flood of infections
before it even properly started to take off and to do nothing at all was never
an option for governments unwilling to let a very large number of their citi-
zens die. We believe that we will see a larger explanatory power of public
policy theories during the second wave. One can already observe, to some
extent, a return of courts as a veto-player influencing the nature of policy
measures and we also see more regionally diverse policies and measures in
more decentralized countries.
Notes
1. The sample we analyze includes European countries with a population of at
least 1 million people plus Luxembourg.
2. Preparedness is a contested term when it comes to financial market crisis,
natural disasters, and also to pandemics. Governments and people cannot
prepare for the next disaster, but only for disasters in general (Plümper et al.,
2017). In respect to pandemics, the WHO has repeatedly, in 1999, 2005, and
2009, published a preparedness plan (WHO, 2009).
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3. At the time of writing, European countries were not yet in a full second wave
but still in the third phase with the ‘dance’ becoming however increasingly
difficult to keep new infections sufficiently low. If and when a full second
wave hits, a return to the ‘hammer’ might be unavoidable though policy-
makers might take a different direction given fears what it would do to a wea-
kened economy that the application of the ‘hammer’ in the first time around
has left behind.
4. In most countries, testing for Sars-CoV-2 only took off in April. See the data pro-
vided by Roser et al. (2020).
5. https://www.zeit.de/wissen/gesundheit/2020-02/coronavirus-china-deutschlan
d-hilfslieferung-bundesregierung-epidemie-desinfektionsmittel-schutzklei
dung.
6. See, for example, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/04/05/world/
europe/italy-coronavirus-lockdown-reopen.html and https://www.aa.com.tr/
en/europe/covid-19-what-went-wrong-in-italy-and-spain/1797461.
7. As of the time of writing, nobody knows for how long people who have had the
virus acquire immunity and thus nobody knows whether herd immunity can be
reached at all.
8. Ireland tried the same strategy but at more than 10 infections per 100,000
people it had to move from soft to moderate lockdown only two days later.
9. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/25/world/europe/belarus-lukashenko-
coronavirus.html.
10. Whilst this second wave lies beyond the scope of this article, we suspect that a
harsh response during the first wave for economic reasons impedes an appro-
priate response at a later stage of the pandemic when the second wave starts. A
comparison of policy responses between the first and second wave should
prove a fruitful avenue for future research.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes on contributors
Thomas Plümper is Professor of Quantitative Social Research, Vienna University of
Economics, and Director of Analytics Datafabric.
Eric Neumayer is Pro-Director (Pro-Vice Chancellor) Planning and Resources and Pro-
fessor of Environment and Development, London School of Economics and Political
Science.
References
Andersen, M. (2020). Early evidence on social distancing in response to COVID-19 in
the United States. unp. manuscript, SSRN 3569368.
Béland, D. (2009). Ideas, institutions, and policy change. Journal of European Public
Policy, 16(5), 701–718. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760902983382
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 19
Bouckaert, G., Van Hecke, S., Galli, D., Kuhlmann, S., & Reiter, R. (2020). European cor-
onationalism? A hot spot governing a pandemic crisis. Public Administration Review,
80(5), 765–773. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13242
Chudik, A., Pesaran, M. H., & Rebucci, A. (2020). Voluntary and mandatory social distan-
cing: Evidence on covid-19 exposure rates from Chinese provinces and selected
countries. unp. Manuscript Johns Hopkins Carey Business School Research Paper
No. 20-03.
Conyon, M. J., He, L., & Thomsen, S. (2020). Lockdowns and COVID-19 deaths in
Scandinavia. unp. Manuscript SSRN 3616969.
Eurostat. (2020). News release. Euroindicators 121/2020.
Ghislandi, S., Muttarak, R., Sauerberg, M., & Scotti, B. (2020). News from the front:
Estimation of excess mortality and life expectancy in the major epicenters of the
COVID-19 pandemic in Italy. unp. manuscript medRxiv 20084335.
Hale, Thomas, Angrist, Noam, Cameronblake, Emily, Hallas, Laura, Kira, Beatriz,
Majumdar, Saptarshi, Petherick, Anna, Phillips, Toby, Tatlow, Helen, & Webster,
Samuel. (2020-10-22). Variation in Government Responses to COVID-19 Version 8.0.
Blavatnik School of Government Working Paper.
Helsingen, L. M., Refsum, E., Gjostein, D. K., Loberg, M., Bretthauer, M., Kalager, M., &
Emilsson, L. (2020). Trust, threats, and consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic
in Norway and Sweden: A comparative survey. unp. manuscript medRxiv 20089953.
Hunter, D. J. (2020). Covid-19 and the stiff upper lip – The pandemic response in the
United Kingdom. New England Journal of Medicine, 382(16), e31. https://doi.org/10.
1056/NEJMp2005755
Kamkhaji, J. C., & Radaelli, C. M. (2017). Crisis, learning and policy change in the
European Union. Journal of European Public Policy, 24(5), 714–734. https://doi.org/
10.1080/13501763.2016.1164744
Kobasa, D., Takada, A., Shinya, K., Hatta, M., Halfmann, P., Theriault, S., & Usui, T. (2004).
Enhanced virulence of influenza A viruses with the haemagglutinin of the 1918 pan-
demic virus. Nature, 431(7009), 703–707. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature02951
Laliotis, I., & Minos, D. (2020). Spreading the disease: The role of culture. Covid
Economics, 1(40), 180–210.
Maier, B. F., & Brockmann, D. (2020). Effective containment explains subexponential
growth in recent confirmed COVID-19 cases in China. Science, 368(6492), 742–
746. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abb4557
Medeiros, M., Street, A., Valladão, D., Vasconcelos, G., & Zilberman, E. (2020). Short-
term covid-19 forecast for latecomers. unp. manuscript arXiv 2004.07977.
Modig, K., & Ebeling, M. (2020). Excess mortality from covid-19. Weekly excess death
rates by age and sex for Sweden. unp. manuscript medRxiv 20096909.
Obinger, H., & Wagschal, U. (2001). Families of nations and public policy. West
European Politics, 24(1), 99–114. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380108425419
Parnell, D., Widdop, P., Bond, A., & Wilson, R. (2020). COVID-19, networks and sport.
Managing Sport and Leisure, 25, 1–7. https://doi.org/10.1080/23750472.2020.
1750100
Paulo, A. C., Correia-Neves, M., Domingos, T., Murta, A. G., & Pedrosa, J. (2010).
Influenza infectious dose may explain the high mortality of the second and third
wave of 1918–1919 influenza pandemic. PLoS One, 5(7), e11655. https://doi.org/
10.1371/journal.pone.0011655
Plümper, T., Flores, A. Q., & Neumayer, E. (2017). The double-edged sword of learning
from disasters: Mortality in the Tohoku tsunami. Global Environmental Change, 44,
49–56. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2017.03.002
20 T. PLÜMPER AND E. NEUMAYER
Plümper, T., & Neumayer, E. (2020a). Sumer school holidays and the growth rate in
Sars-CoV-2 infections across German districts. unp. manuscript medRxiv 20210773.
Plümper, T., & Neumayer, E. (2020b). The pandemic predominantly hits poor neigh-
bourhoods? SARS-CoV-2 infections and Covid-19 fatalities in German districts.
European Journal of Public Health, https://doi.org/10.1093/eurpub/ckaa168
Pueyo, T. (2020). Coronavirus. The hammer and the dance. Medium. Retrieved March
19, 2020 from medium.com/@tomaspueyo/coronavirus-the-hammer-and-the-
dance-be9337092b56
Roser, M., Ritchie, H., & Ortiz-Ospina, E. (2020). Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) –
Statistics and research. Our World in Data, https://ourworldindata.org
Schmitt, F. J. (2020). A simplified model for expected development of the SARS-CoV-2
(Corona) spread in Germany and US after social distancing. unp. manuscript arXiv
2003.10891.
World Health Organization. (2009). Pandemic influenza preparedness and response: A
WHO guide document. WHO.
Yan, B., Zhang, X., Wu, L., Zhu, H., & Chen, B. (2020). Why do countries respond differ-
ently to COVID-19? A comparative study of Sweden, China, France, and Japan.
American Review of Public Administration. https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074020
942445
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 21
